“This article sounds good superficially - after all the recent Sony fiasco has made it difficult, if not foolhardy, to trust any original media at all.

However, the article fails to mention the one thing that would cause its logic to fall apart: most of the material available for free on P2P networks was sourced from the very media the article is urging users to avoid. Take a look at the NFOs of your album downloads, for example, and you’ll notice that they’ll say “Source: CDDA” with a release date or some other indication that the files were ripped from a commercial release. The same with a large portion of the movies available for download.

If release groups (NOT to be confused with pirates-for-profit, who are straight-up criminals) are getting by, then most fairly knowledgeable users should be able to.

The reason for this is simple: most of the media released nowadays was made for standalone players, which precluded the content industry for mandating the installation of any software for playback to be enabled. Most, if not all active copy protection schemes (active = implemented by locally run software that interferes with the ripping process, as opposed to passive, such as CSS) rely on AutoPlay to work. Turning off AutoPlay solves most (if not all) of the malicious software issues, and if you try several ripping programs you’re likely to find that at least one will read the protected disc.

ASIDE: the above argument does not apply to software discs, which often require installation, period.

Those who want even more security can install AnyDVD to actively block unauthorized installations from any inserted discs.

Bottom line: if you know what you’re doing, there’s hardly any real risk from original media in general.”

Wouldn’t you love to see this clown negotiate his way out of bed in the morning? HIS bottom line is BS. And everybody who writes rootkits knows it. Does his mother know he’s using her computer again? http://www.slyck.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=16474

From ZDNet UK: “At Microsoft’s IT Forum 2005 event in Barcelona this week, Windows programme manager Mike Danseglio delved into the technical aspects of rootkits.

How do we remove rootkits?
There is only one guaranteed way to remove a rootkit: you destroy the system and then rebuild it. There is no other way to reliable remove a rootkit - no other way whatsoever.

You can’t delete the file or even reinstall the operating system over the top of the existing OS - which is a horrible practice anyway. It is super important to nuke the system because a rootkit’s primary function is stealth - what is it hiding? Do you know? Usually not. How can you reliably know what it was hiding, what it was compromising or what it was removing?”

Wow.

http://insight.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020457,39237277,00.htm